The structure of a Silverman game can be explained very quickly: Each of two players independently selects a number out of a prede termined set, not necessarily the same one for both of them. The higher number wins unless it is at least k times as high as the other one; if this is the case the lower number wins. The game ends in a draw if both numbers are equal. k is a constant greater than 1. The simplicity of the rules stimulates the curiosity of the the orist. Admittedly, Silverman games do not seem to have a direct applied significance, but nevertheless much can be learnt from their study. This book succeeds to give an almost complete overview over the structure of optimal strategies and it reveals a surprising wealth of interesting detail. A field like game theory does not only need research on broad questions and fundamental issues, but also specialized work on re stricted topics. Even if not many readers are interested in the subject matter, those who are will appreciate this monograph.
| Autorius: | Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger, Gerald A. Heuer, |
| Serija: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
| Leidėjas: | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| Išleidimo metai: | 1995 |
| Knygos puslapių skaičius: | 300 |
| ISBN-10: | 3540592326 |
| ISBN-13: | 9783540592327 |
| Formatas: | Knyga minkštu viršeliu |
| Kalba: | Anglų |
| Žanras: | Economic theory and philosophy |
Parašykite atsiliepimą apie „Silverman¿s Game: A Special Class of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games“
